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Our paper [Phys. Rev. A 86, 032325 (2012)], setting forth a previously unknown connection between the
Bennett 1992 protocol and a Bell inequality, has recently received a Comment [Phys. Rev. A 93, 066303 (2016)]
about a possible flaw in its potential device-independent (DI) implementation. We point the authors of the
Comment to prior works showing that what they assume to be specific to our protocol’s DI implementation is
actually a standard assumption in DI quantum key distribution. Therefore there is no need to revise any of the
conclusions drawn in Lucamarini et al. [Phys. Rev. A 86, 032325 (2012)].
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.93.066304
In Ref. [1], we described a somewhat surprising connection
between the long-standing prepare-and-measure (PM) Bennett
1992 (B92) protocol [2] for quantum key distribution (QKD)
and the Clauser-Horne (CH) type of Bell inequality [3]. The
main advantage of our result is that it allows for overcoming the
PM nature of the B92, making it suitable for an entanglement-
based implementation where the source of the entangled pho-
tons is owned by the adversary, Eve. Previous security proofs of
the B92 [4,5] had to assume that the photons were prepared by a
legitimate transmitter, Alice, making the protocol intrinsically
PM. Our work removed this constraint, thus broadening the
applicability of the B92. A proof-of-principle experiment of
the protocol, called Lucamarini-Vallone-Gianani-Mataloni-Di
Giuseppe (LVGMD), was in fact provided in Ref. [6].
The connection with the CH inequality allowed us to prove
the security of the entanglement-based B92 protocol using
the mathematical tools introduced in Ref. [7], which do not
require a detailed characterization of the devices used in a
QKD implementation. Here, it is worth noticing that “no
detailed characterization of devices” is not equivalent to “no
assumption is needed to prove the security of DI-QKD.”
There are still assumptions in DI-QKD [8–11]. Typically, no
assumption is needed on the dimension of the Hilbert space
of the quantum signals sent to the measuring devices or about
the exact calibration of the measuring devices. The standard
assumptions in DI-QKD can be read for instance in Ref. [11]
and are the following:
(1) secure locations,
(2) trusted random number generators,
(3) trusted classical devices,
(4) authenticated classical channel between Alice and Bob,
(5) quantum physics is correct.
In some cases [12], the last assumption can be replaced by
the no-signaling condition. Within the above-listed assump-
tions, the users can turn the quantum information into classical
and process it without risk of being observed by Eve.
Assumption 1 corresponds to the fact that the legitimate
users sit within secure perimeters that are not penetrable
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by the eavesdropper, i.e., no unwanted information can leak
to the outside. Assumption 3 is related to the functioning
of classical measuring devices used to store, process, and
communicate the classical data (e.g., memories and computing
devices) generated by their quantum apparatuses. If they were
controlled by Eve, this would lead to a catastrophic violation
of the quantum-enabled DI security [13] as also noted by the
authors of Ref. [14].
Assumption 2 is a perhaps less widely known assumption
in DI-QKD: The random number generators (RNGs) used
by the legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, have to be within
the above-mentioned secure perimeters, outside Eve’s reach.
They are assumed to work properly and generate a string of
random numbers uniformly distributed. For a general DI-QKD
protocol, this is clearly stated, e.g., in Ref. [15]. There it is
shown that removing such an assumption from a DI protocol
clearly affects its secure key rate: by using the words of
Ref. [15] “the bad quality of randomness used there has a
big impact on the security.”
More specifically for our case, the same assumption is
explicitly mentioned on p. 2, column 2, paragraph 1, line
7 of Ref. [7], which is the work employed in the security
proof of Ref. [1]: “the inputs x and y are chosen uniformly at
random” (x and y are the basis settings for Alice and Bob,
respectively). Finally, the same assumption appears in the
recently performed loophole-free Bell tests [16–18], which
represent the prerequisite of any DI-QKD setup. In those
experiments, great care was taken to guarantee that the RNGs
were unbiased and independent of Eve’s action [19].
After having clarified the above points, let us come to
the criticism of our work contained in Ref. [14]. In our
view, the Comment actually targets two works, i.e., Refs. [1,6]
with the following two points:
(1) The RNG owned by Bob in the entanglement-based
B92 [1] can be biased. This can affect the protocol’s secure
key rate, so the protocol is not DI.
(2) The experiment performed in Ref. [6] is not loophole
free, so it does not represent a DI implementation of the
protocol in Ref. [1].
From our preliminary clarifications, the inconsistency of
the above criticism should be apparent. The comment in point
(1) could be addressed against most of the existing DI-QKD
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protocol even those based on the BB84 protocol [20]. The
possible bias of the RNG is not automatically included in
any DI scenario, and a specific analysis is required to analyze
this problem [15]. Point (2) is quite shallow. In science, it
is perfectly legitimate and customary to perform proof-of-
concept experiments under reasonable assumptions. In the
case of Ref. [6], a proof-of-principle experiment as written in
the title, the fair sampling assumption was enforced as in all
the Bell inequality tests performed so far with the exception
of the already cited works [16–18].
In conclusion, we argue that the argument contained in
the Comment [14] is trivial since it is well known that for
the DI-QKD protocol the quality of randomness in the basis
choice has an effect on the security. Then, the Comment [14]
does not invalidate our LVGMD protocol [1] since we assumed
unbiased RNG as performed in most DI-QKD protocols. We
agree that a loophole-free Bell violation must be obtained to
guarantee the security of the key in the protocol introduced
in Ref. [1], but this applies to any DI-QKD protocol: Indeed
random basis choices are required to close the freedom-of-
choice loophole in a Bell test.
A better result, not contained in Ref. [14], would be the
quantitative estimation of the effect of the bias in the key
security in the LVGMD protocol, similar to what was per-
formed in Ref. [15] for the the DI-QKD protocol based on the
Collins-Gisin-Linden- Massar-Popescu inequality [21] (a gen-
eralization of the well-known Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
inequality [22]). We leave this investigation for future research.
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